NOTES
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF
ADJUDICATORY POWER TO FEDERAL
AGENCIES AND THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY
The continued growth of the administrative bureaucracy and its increased impact on the rights and duties of citizens is a well-documented
phenomenon of the twentieth century.1 At the federal level, bureaucracy

2
flourishes as Congress delegates ever more responsibility to agencies.

Within their statutorily defined fields, federal agencies typically perform
the functions of rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication. 3 This note

focuses on the adjudicatory function 4 and considers whether, when Congress creates a new statutory cause of action, 5 the seventh amendment 6
limits Congress's ability to delegate responsibility for adjudicating cases
under that statute to a federal administrative tribunal rather than an arti1. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERicAN GOVERNMENT 3-5 (1978). The Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 1887, is
regarded by administrative law academics as the first of the modem administrative agencies. Fallon,
Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REV. 915, 923 n.50
(1988).
2. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5 ("Under Democratic and Republican Presidents alike,
Congress has regularly chosen to rely upon administrative regulation-rather than upon civil remedies, criminal penalties, subsidies to the private sector, or the fre-market... -to implement public
policies in new and complex areas of federal concern.").
3. W. GELLHORN, C. BysE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, ADMIISTRATIVE
LAW 1 (8th ed. 1987). "Agency," for the purposes of this note, includes both executive branch
agencies and independent regulatory agencies.
4. The note analyzes the impact of the seventh amendment on administrative adjudications.
Since the seventh amendment does not apply to the states, see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1876), the focus is linited to the federal administrative bureaucracy.
5. See, eg., S. 558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2256 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987)
(bill introduced to amend Fair Housing Act by providing for new administrative enforcement mechanism). This bill provides a useful example of the issues raised in seventh amendment challenges and
will be referred to frequently. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution
has held hearings on whether the enforcement provisions of S. 558 violate the seventh amendment.
See [1987-1988] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,008. The Subcommittee approved S. 558 by a four-to-one
vote on June 23, 1987. See 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3227 (1987).
6. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
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cle III court. 7
This area of administrative law currently suffers from a confusion
that the Supreme Court has yet to clarify, in part because Congress has
not yet breached the seventh amendment limit." This note argues that

the seventh amendment does limit Congress's ability to assign such responsibility to administrative tribunals. It first reviews the seventh

amendment caselaw, emphasizing the Supreme Court's seminal decision
in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Commission,9 and then compares that jurisprudence with the article III

caselaw.10 This comparative approach reflects the fact that congressional
delegation of adjudicatory responsibility to an administrative agency is
subject to both seventh amendment and article III objections. 11 In fact,
the Supreme Court focuses on the same principle--"public rights"-in

12
analyzing the two objections to administrative determination of cases.

The note then considers whether the Supreme Court has established
a seventh amendment limit on Congress's ability to delegate adjudicatory

authority; concurrently, it surveys the practical policy considerations and
13
constitutional principles apparently at odds in formulating the limit.
The note concludes by describing such a seventh amendment limit, based
on the Court's opinions and underlying constitutional doctrine. Specifi-

cally, when Congress creates statutory causes of action and empowers
federal agencies to adjudicate cases under those statutes, Congress can
delegate the power to adjudicate private legal rights only if determination
of such rights is necessary to implement the underlying regulatory

scheme.
7. As article III provides: "The Judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made.., under their Authority.... ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
8. The Court has granted certiorari in a case that may help define a seventh amendment limit.
See Colt Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted
sub norm Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S.Ct. 1105 (1988) (No. 87-996). Coit, a
creditor of an insolvent savings and loan association in receivership, argues that the statutory grant
of exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the receiver) violates both the seventh amendment right to trial by jury and article III. For a
discussion of the arguments in Colt Independence, see Baxter, Life in the Administrative Track;
Admlnstrative Adjudication ofClaims Against Savings InstitutionReceiverships, 1988 DUKE L.. 422,
427-28.
9. 430 U.S. 442 (1977); see infra notes 14-71 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., Colt Independence, 829 F.2d at 564-65; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S 22, 37 (1932);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 273 (1856).
12. See infra notes 60-71, 83-124 and accompanying text. Compare Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion) (article III objection) with
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 442 (seventh amendment objection).
13. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
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I.

A.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The HistoricalTest.

The seventh amendment provides that "[iln Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved." 1 4 In construing the amendment, the
Supreme Court has long been guided by the practices of the English
courts in 1791, the year of the amendment's adoption. 15 This "historical
test" is rooted in the amendment's language, especially the word "preserved."' 16 In United States v. Wonson, the first recorded case discussing
the foundations of the seventh amendment, Justice Story concluded that
it is "obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law" and
"[b]eyond all question [that] the common law... alluded to [in the seventh amendment] is not the common law of any individual state, (for it
probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand
reservoir of all our jurisprudence."'17 Thus, the "right" preserved in the
seventh amendment is the right of trial by jury under the English common law of 1791.
Using a snapshot of English history to interpret the seventh amendment has, however, proven difficult. In 1791, the English law courts
were separate and independent from the equity courts, and a jury trial
was available only in the law courts.' But "the line between law and
equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and
static one."' 9 This separation was not necessarily determined by the type
of case involved, or whether a judge or a jury could best address the
issues in the case. 20 The equity courts, rather, existed principally to compensate for the shortcomings of the common law courts and the inade21
quacy of common law remedies.
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
15. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MiNN. L. REv. 639,
640 (1973); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("In order to ascertain the scope
and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common
law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.").
16. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 640. Wolfram notes that, surprisingly, no federal court has
justified the use of the historical approach by citing historical materials surrounding the adoption of
the seventh amendment, such as The FederalistPapers. Id. at 720.
17. 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, J.).
18. 5 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.0815.-1] (2d ed.
1987).
19. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.. 655, 658 (1963).
20. Id. at 661. There were common law suits for which no right to jury trial existed under
English common law. See 5 J. MoRE, supra note 18, %38.08[5.---6] (examples include proceedings
for disbarment, contempt, habeas corpus and deportation of an alien).
21. Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176, 1179 (1961).
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Consequently, in order to determine the scope of the English common law right to trial by jury as preserved by the seventh amendment,
the American courts needed to develop a workable definition of "suits at
common law." In this connection, Justice Story wrote in Parsons v.

Bedford:
By common law, [the framers] meant what the constitution denominated in the third article "law;" not merely suits, which the common
law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered .... In a just sense, the [seventh]
amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are
not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may
be the peculiar
22
form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
The Court thus defined "common law" in the seventh amendment synonymously with "law" in article 11123 and broadly construed the
amendment to include all suits outside equity and admiralty jurisdiction.
B. A Flexible Interpretationof the HistoricalTest.
Although some commentators have argued that the language of the
seventh amendment supports a strict historical reading, i.e., that a right
to a jury trial should exist only for those actions at common law recognized by the English courts of 1791,24 the Supreme Court has never
adopted this stance. Indeed, the historical interpretation of the amendment has not foreclosed the right to a jury trial under many of the causes
of action created in the United States since 1791.25 As Justice Story in
fact recognized in Parsonsv. Bedford, the seventh amendment guarantees
the right to a jury trial whenever "legal rights" are at issue; the right,
therefore, is not limited to the "old and settled" proceedings of the common law. 26 The Court will still look to the English common law of 1791
for guidance but will hold the seventh amendment applicable if the new
action involves the rights and remedies traditionally enforced in actions
at law. 27
22. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. See, eg., Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury TriaLb A Study in the Irrationalityof
RationalDecision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 531 (1975) (advocating strict historical test); see
also James, supra note 19, at 664 (enumerating arguments supporting "a static historical test").
25. Redish, supra note 24, at 490.
26. Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447.
27. See, eg., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1974) (finding that suit for recovery of property "serves the same essential function" as common law action of ejectment; upholding
right to jury trial).
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In Curtis v. Loether,28 the Court first squarely addressed the issue of
whether the seventh amendment should apply to post-1791 causes of action created by congressional enactment. Curtis involved a private cause
of action under the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.29 Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that

"(t]he Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary
30
courts of law."
The Court recently cited Curtis as precedent in Tull v. United
States.31 In that case, the government sued a real estate developer for
dumping fill on Virginia wetlands. The government sought injunctive
relief and fines exceeding twenty-two million dollars under the Clean
Water Act. 32 The trial court denied the defendant's timely demand for a

33
jury trial, imposed fines and granted the government injunctive relief.
On appeal the Supreme Court considered the nature of the action and the
remedy sought. It articulated a two-part test to determine whether a
right to a jury trial exists in a statutory action. The test requires that
courts first compare the statutory action at issue to eighteenth-century
English actions at law and then examine the remedy prescribed in the
statute to determine if it is legal or equitable in nature. 34 Applying this
test in Tull, the Court held that the seventh amendment guarantees the
right to a jury trial on the issue of liability, but not on the issue of damages, when the federal government seeks relief in federal court under the
35
Clean Water Act.

C.

The Expansion of the Seventh Amendment After the Merger of
Law and Equity.
The merger of law and equity in 1938 under the Federal Rules of
28. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).

29. Id. at 189-90; see Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982).
30. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
31. 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987) (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193, 196).
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
33. Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1833-34.
34. Id. at 1835. The Court considers the remedy analysis more important "than finding a
precisely analogous common law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment
guarantees a jury trial." Id. at 1837.
The Tull Court also admitted that the adjudication of rights in administrative proceedings
outside traditional courts of law raised other considerations, such as the practical limitations of a
jury trial. Id at 1835 n.4; see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
35. Tull, 107 U.S. at 1840.
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Civil Procedure 36 raised new seventh amendment issues. In a series of

three cases, the Supreme Court considered the implications of the law
and equity merger and dramatically expanded the right to trial by jury. 37
The historical test remained in seventh amendment jurisprudence, but

the Court recognized that the test needed adjustment, since the law/equity (jury/nonjury) distinction had been eliminated. 38
In the first case, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,39 the Court con-

sidered the seventh amendment implications of a treble damages counterclaim under the antitrust laws and held that, when resolution of legal and

equitable claims depends on a determination of the same issues, legal
claims must be submitted to a jury before adjudication of equitable

claims. 40 The Court emphasized that, unless the plaintiff demonstrates
"irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies," it will not grant
equitable injunctive relief.41 In expanding the "legal" remedies available,

the new procedures under the Federal Rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act also "necessarily affected" (i.e., reduced) the province of equity. 42 The Court thus construed the seventh amendment as creating a

strong preference for jury trials. 43

The Court reaffirmed and strengthened the Beacon Theatres holding
in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.44 There the Court held that if a legal

claim and various equitable claims involve common factual issues, then
the legal claim must be determined first.4 5 The Court emphatically rejected the argument that a party has no right to a jury trial if the legal
issues are "incidental" to the equitable issues.4 6 The Court reiterated
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'.")
The original Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the Supreme Court and forwarded to Congress pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. The merger of law and equity became effective on September 16, 1938. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDEaAL COURTS § 62, at 403-04 (4th ed. 1983).
37. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
479-80 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
38. Cf. James, supra note 19, at 664 (favoring an "elastic construction" of historical test that
would accommodate shifts reflecting authentic historical patterns of change).
39. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
40. Id. at 508.
41. Id. at 506-07.
42. Id. at 509.
43. As the Court stated: "[Only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right
to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." Id. at 5 10-11
(footnote omitted).
44. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 470. The Court thus rejected the "equitable clean-up doctrine," which allowed a
court of equity to resolve legal claims incidental to the primary equitable claim as a mechanism to
avoid the hardships of separate law and equity courts. Commentators, while criticizing the Dairy
Queen Court's rationale, have accepted its holding because the need for the clean-up doctrine disap-
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that the Federal Rules preserve the right to a jury trial and that, by expanding the scope of legal remedies, procedural changes in the Rules
concomitantly expanded the right to a jury trial. 47
Finally, in Ross v. Bernard,4 8 the Court held that a right to a jury
trial exists in a stockholder's derivative suit when the underlying corporate claim is legal, stating that "[t]he historical rule preventing a court of
law from entertaining a shareholder's suit on behalf of the corporation is
obsolete."' 49 The Court did briefly mention one of the assumptions underlying the historical test-the nonstatic character of the line between
law and equity.5 0
D.

Seventh Amendment Challenges to Administrative Adjudication.

The Supreme Court ignores the historical test when confronting seventh amendment objections in cases before administrative tribunals. Instead of focusing on the legal or equitable nature of the action and the
remedies sought,5 1 the Court effectively recognizes a third category of
civil action-statutory actions before administrative tribunals.5 2 The
Court has never held that the seventh amendment guarantees the right to
5 3
a jury trial in a proceeding before an administrative tribunal
peared with the merger of law and equity. See Redish, supra note 24, at 497-98. Professor Redish,
however, suggests a revitalization of "the classic clean-up doctrine" as a basis for restricting the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 530-31.
47. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 472, 478 n.19. In its decision, the Court pointed to both Rule
18(a), which permits the joinder of legal and equitable claims, and Rule 53(b), which provides that
the district court may appoint special masters to assist the jury in those exceptional cases that involve legal issues too complicated for the jury to handle alone.
48. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
49. Id. at 540. Strict application of the historical test would certainly have labeled a stockholder's suit as equitable. See id. at 534 ("The common law refused ... to permit stockholders to
call corporate managers to account in actions at law.").
50. Id. at 533, 539. The Court seems to imply that the Federal Rules interrupted a process that
might have culminated in the law courts' recognition of a shareholder's derivative suit. Id. at 53739. This analysis would be consistent with the "elastic construction" of the historical test advocated
by Professor James. See James, supra note 19, at 664; supra note 38. In 1791, however, shareholders definitely could not have brought a derivative suit in the law courts. Professor Redish argues
that the Ross decision does much more than modernize historical practices to take account of the
new procedures: "[it] effectively rejects the dictates of history for no apparent reason other than
simple disagreement with the historical practice." Redish, supra note 24, at 501 (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987) (right to jury trial in district
court determined by analyzing nature of action and remedy sought).
52. See Note, Article III Implicationsfor the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment to Federal
StatutoryActions, 95 YALE L.J. 1459, 1461 n.12 (1986) (noting that Court's interpretation of seventh
amendment depends on forum in which action is brought; an identical action may be termed common law suit in article III court, but statutory action in non-article III tribunal).
53. Some commentators simply state that the seventh amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.1, at 410 (3d ed.
1985); 5 J. MOORE, supra note 18,
38.08[5.-4]. This note argues, however, that the seventh
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The Court first faced a seventh amendment objection to administrative adjudication in a New Deal-era case, National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.5 4 Under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress had delegated to the National Labor Relations Board the task of identifying unfair labor practices and ordering an

appropriate remedy.5 5 Jones & Laughlin argued that a Board order to
provide back pay as a remedy was equivalent to damages, thus creating a

right to a jury trial. Without citing any authority, the Court held: "The
instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit.
The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory

proceeding.... The contention under the Seventh Amendment is with'56
out merit."

Jones & Laughlin remained dormant as seventh amendment precedent until 1974, when the Court "explained" it in Curtis v. Loether:
"Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh

Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings,
where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of ad-

ministrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with the
NLRB's role in the statutory scheme."5 7T Two months after Curtis, in
Pernell v. SouthallRealty, the Court again upheld the right to a jury trial

in federal proceeding under a statutory cause of action and explained the
administrative agency exception in terms almost identical to those used
in Curtis.58
In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Commission, the Supreme Court relied on Jones & Laughlin, Curtis and
Pernell in rejecting a seventh amendment challenge to a statutory scheme
that allowed an administrative agency to impose civil penalties on violaamendment does restrict the kinds of actions that administrative tribunals may adjudicate without a
jury. See infra notes 151-89 and accompanying text.
54. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
55. Ch. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 449,453-55 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982)); Jones&
Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 24.
56. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 48-49.
57. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For support, the Court quoted L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 90 (1965). Id
at 194 n.8. Professor Jaffe, however, states that the seventh amendment may exclude the use of an
administrative agency as a factfinder or an adjudicatory forum. L. JAFFE, supra ("Where [the seventh amendment] applies it will, of course, exclude the use of an agency either as fact finder or
forum.").
58. 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974). Citing the relevant precedent in the landlord/tenant dispute
context, the Court stated: "Block v. Hirsh[, 256 U.S. 135 (1921),] merely stands for the principle
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury
trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication.").
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tors of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.59 A unanimous
Court held that "[a]t least in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated.., the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from as-

signing the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an
administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible." 6

This "public rights" exception followed not from the historical test, as
applied in the seventh amendment context, but rather from "the proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue
to be resolved but also on theforum in which it is to be resolved."61 Thus,
the Court held that the seventh amendment would not apply to an administrative adjudication even if a jury trial would be required on the
62
same issue in federal court.
In building the "public rights" exception to the seventh amendment,
63
Justice White, writing for the Court, pursued two lines of reasoning.
He first cited several tax, tax penalty, and customs and immigration pen-

alty cases that recognized, albeit without discussing seventh amendment
issues, the authority of administrative agencies to impose flnes.6 One of
65
the cited cases, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
contains what seems to be the first judicial intimation of the public rights
66
doctrine.
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may

or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United

67
States, as it may deem proper.

59. 430 U.S. 442, 453-56 (1977) (upholding Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982))).
60. 430 U.S. at 450.
The Court has never indicated, though, that it would consider a jury to be compatible with
administrative adjudication, and one should not read the final clause in the Court's statement as such
an indication.
61. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see infra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 460-61.
63. Kirst, Administrative Penaltiesand the CivilJury: The Supreme Court'sAssault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1287 (1978).
64. Atlas Roofing 430 U.S. at 450-51 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (tax
penalty); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932) (customs and
immigration penalty); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (taxes); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (customs and immigration penalty); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (tax recovery)); see also Kirst,
supra note 63, at 1287 n.30.
65. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
66. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (stating that public rights doctrine traces directly to Murray's Lessee).
67. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284, quoted in Atlas Roofing 430 U.S. at 451 n.8
(emphasis added).
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Justice White then reviewed five cases to develop the proposition
that the seventh amendment does not prohibit Congress from delegating
the adjudication of public rights to federal agencies. 68 He attempted to
define public rights with only the following examples: "e.g., cases in
which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public
rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact" 69 or
"e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under
'70
an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights."
Although the Court strictly limited its holding to public rights, in contradistinction to private rights, 7 1Atlas Roofing marks the Court's first use of
72
the public rights doctrine to restrict the seventh amendment.

II.

ARTICLE III JURISPRUDENCE

A comparison of the Supreme Court's seventh amendment jurisprudence with the Court's analysis of article III limits on congressional delegation of adjudicatory functions to administrative tribunals is important
for several reasons. First, seventh amendment issues and article III issues may simultaneously arise in connection with such delegations. Second, article III cases have more fully developed the "public rights"
theory that Atlas Roofing first incorporated into seventh amendment jurisprudence. 73 The public rights concept is in fact one part of the balancing test the Court has recently applied in reviewing Congress's delegation
of adjudicatory functions to non-article III tribunals. 74 Finally, the
Court's article III jurisprudence may itself protect the right to a jury
trial, eliminating the need for further protection under the seventh
75
amendment.
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that the "judicial
Power of the United States" will be vested in one Supreme Court and
68. Id. at 451-56 (discussing Jones & Laughlin; Curtis; Pernell; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921), explained in Pernell, 416 U.S. at 382-83; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
69. Id. at 450.
70. Id. at 458 (emphasis added). The use of the term "public rights" in its own definition
reflects the Court's struggle with that concept. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 458 ("Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of
other cases, are not at all implicated.").
72. Kirst, supra note 63, at 1287. Professor Kirst argues that the public rights rule had to be
"created" to sustain the Atlas Roofing holding.
73. See generally Young, PublicRights and the FederalJudicialPower. From Murray's Lessee
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 765 (1986) (extensive review of development of
public rights in article III jurisprudence).
74. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the development of the public rights doctrine and its effect on the juris-

diction of article III courts, see infra notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
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such lower federal courts as Congress establishes. 76 Article III federal
judges are appointed by the President "with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate,"'77 and enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation. 78 While the
language of article III suggests that Congress may only create lower
courts staffed by judges with life tenure and fixed compensation, 79 the
Court has never interpreted the article so narrowly.8 0 The Court has
recognized the authority of Congress to vest adjudicatory power in decisionmakers who are not guaranteed article III protections.8 1 The Court,
however, has consistently refused to read article III so broadly as to provide Congress with plenary authority to create adjudicatory tribunals
outside article 111.82
A.

The Emergence of "PublicRights" Under Article III

Atlas Roofing was the first seventh amendment case to scrutinize the
delegation of adjudicatory authority using the public rights/private
rights distinction; in contrast, the Court has often relied on that distinction in defining the article III limits of congressional delegation.8 3 The
distinction first arose in Murray's Lessee, 84 in which the Court distinguished public rights, which are constitutionally delegable to non-article
III courts, from claims in the nature of a suit at common law, in equity,
or in admiralty, which are constitutionally nondelegable. Justice Curtis,
writing for the Court, described matters involving public rights as subject
to judicial determination, or, if Congress deems proper, equally subject to
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
77. Id. art. II, §2, cl.2.
78. Id. art. III, § 1.
79. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting).
80. See, eg., id.at 70-71 (plurality opinion) (noting that exceptions to independent article III
courts include courts outside the United States, courts-martial, and forums dealing with public
rights); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (IPet.) 511 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.) (upholding congressional power to use non-article III federal courts to adjudicate disputes in federal territories).
81. E.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (approving determinations of fact by United
States Employees' Compensation Commission); see Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581, 582-83 (1985).
82. See, ag., Northern Pipeline 458 U.S. at 50 ("We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 ... has
impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the
Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct."); Resnik, supra
note 81, at 587.
83. See Young, supra note 73, at 769 (noting that the public rights doctrine in article III jurisprudence traces back to 1855 and Murray's Lessee).
84. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856); see Young, supra note 73, at 791-95 (discussion of public/
private rights distinction's origin).
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nonjudicial determination; he did not define public rights. 85
As the administrative state began to flourish in the first half of the
twentieth century, the Court faced new article III challenges to administrative adjudication. Crowell v. Benson, 86 for example, involved the adjudication of a Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
claim before the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. 87
Chief Justice Hughes cited Murray's Lessee to build on the distinction
between private rights and "those which arise between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments." 88 Even though Crowell itself involved a "private right"-"the
liability of one individual to another under the law" -- 89 the Court there
upheld Congress's ability to assign factfinding functions to an administrative forum, analogizing the role of agencies to the role of masters or
assessors in equity and admiralty. 90 Because the compensation statute
applied only to a limited class of master and servant cases, and its effective enforcement required only determinations of factual questions, the
Court found no constitutional obstacle to the assignment of the
"thousands of cases" under the statute to the administrative agency. 9 1
In 1982, the public rights doctrine reached its zenith in Northern
Pipeline ConstructionCo. v. Marathon PipeLine Co. The Court held that
Congress's broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts violated
article 111.92 Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan noted that public
rights cases were an exception to the jurisdiction of article III courts. 93
He then described public rights as extending "only to matters arising 'be85. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. Justice Curtis did no more than provide an
example of a public right that Congress could subject to nonjudicial determination: equitable claims
to land by inhabitants of ceded territories.
86. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
87. Id. at 36.
88. Id. at 50.
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id. The Court quickly disposed of a seventh amendment objection, stating that the suit was
not one at common law, but rather a suit that, in the absence of the statutory scheme, would have
been within admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 45.
91. Id. at 54.
92. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion); id, at 91-92 (Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring).
Article III and seventh amendment issues continue to arise in the bankruptcy context. See
generally Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands ofArticle III and the Seventh
Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REv. 967 (1988) (arguing that jury trial rights exist for some bankruptcy
matters and that seventh amendment and article III questions can be resolved by conducting such
trials before article III district judges). The Court may define a seventh amendment limit this Term
in Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (1 1th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2818 (1988).
93. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70.
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tween the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments,' and only to matters that historically could have
been determined exclusively by those departments. '94 Unwilling to clarify the muddled distinction between public and private rights, the plurality would only say that public rights "must at a minimum arise 'between
the government and others,' ,95 and that private rights involve" 'the liability of one individual to another under the law.' ",96
B.

The Retreatfrom "PublicRights" Under Article III

Three years later, the Court retreated from Justice Brennan's view
of the public rights doctrine. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co., 97 the Court noted that only a plurality in Northern Pipeline
had concluded that the public rights doctrine provided a bright-line test.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Union Carbide majority, then rejected
the argument that the right to an article III forum is absolute unless the
federal government is a party of record; she recognized that accepting
that argument would cast doubt on the constitutionality of much of the
administrative state.98 The Union Carbide Court saw the public rights
doctrine as "a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a
quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,' the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced." 99
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, declined to reject his Northern
94. Id. at 67-68 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan, however, refrained from defining public
rights or private rights. Id at 69.
95. Id (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). The plurality again cited
Murray's Lessee for the distinction between suits that by their "nature" were suits at common law,
equity, or admiralty, and those that could be withdrawn from the cognizance of article III courts
because they involved public rights. Id. at 69 n.23. Justice Brennan added that the presence of the
United States as a proper party to the proceeding was a "necessary but not sufficient means of
distinguishing 'public rights' from 'private rights'." Id.
96. Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51).
97. 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
98. Id. at 585-87.
99. Id at 589 (quoting Northern Fipeline, 458 U.S. at 68).
Despite its disavowal of the importance of the public rights doctrine in article III jurisprudence,
the Union Carbide Court did describe the statutory scheme passed by Congress as bearing many of
the characteristics of a public right. 473 U.S. at 589. The dispute involved private parties at odds
over payments for the use of research data as mandated by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. See id.at 575-78. The Act provides for binding arbitration of disputes arising
between a registrant who has submitted research data on its products' health and safety characteristics to the EPA as required under the Act, and a follow-on registrant who is required to compensate
the prior registrant for the use of the original data. Id at 571-73. The Court recognized that Congress had set up an extensive program to protect the public health and that "[u]se of a registrant's
data to support a follow-on registration serves a public purpose." Id. at 589.
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Pipeline view of the public rights doctrine.100 He agreed with the majority that the presence or absence of the government as a party is not the
determinative factor in defining public rights cases, but emphasized that,
even though the case involved the determination of rights owed one private party by another, the dispute arose "in the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the field."' 01 He agreed with
Congress's decision that the public policies underlying the comprehensive regulatory scheme required arbitration and thus justified the federal
agency's active participation in resolving the private dispute.102
In 1986, the Court again rejected an article III challenge to administrative adjudication in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor. 103 Writing for the Court once again, Justice O'Connor described
article III's purpose as protecting both the judiciary's independent role in
the constitutional scheme of separation of powers and individual litigants' right to an independent judiciary.10 4 Based on this underlying
purpose, as well as the view that formalistic, bright-line rules would be
too restrictive and unworkable for Congress,10 5 the Court outlined a
four-part balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of adjudication in a non-article III forum: (1) the extent to which the statutory
scheme reserves the essential attributes of judicial power for article III
courts; (2) the extent to which the non-article III forum exercises the
jurisdiction and powers normally vested in article III courts; (3) the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of article III;
and (4) the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated in the
06
non-article III forum.
Acknowledging that Schor involved a private right,10 7 the Court applied Union Carbide and held that the public rights doctrine only reflects
In the end, the Court sustained the Act, but limited its holding to cases involving private rights
"so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." Id. at 593-94.
100. Id. at 600 ("Because the approach of the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the demands of contemporary government while preserving the constitutional system of checks and balances, I adhere to it as the proper analysis for resolving the
present case.") (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
104. Id. at 847-49.
105. Id. at 851 ("Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of
the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action
pursuant to its article I powers.").
106. Id. at 853.
107. Id. at 837-38, 853. The private right involved was a state-law counterclaim for a debt owed
to a commodities dealer.
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pragmatic considerations and is not determinative in article III cases. 108
As the Court also noted, the Constitution does not forbid Congress to
divest the article III courts of jurisdiction over private right claims that
are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a regulatory scheme.10 9
Il.

THE CURRENT CONFUSION-PUBLIC RIGHTS
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS

The first step in determining whether the Court has established a
seventh amendment, as opposed to an article III, limit on Congress's authority to delegate adjudicatory responsibility is to reevaluate the stature
of the public rights exception established in Atlas Roofing. "0 As an initial concern, the Court has offered no firm definition of public rights in
either seventh amendment or article III cases. In the article III context,
the public rights doctrine, as originally articulated in Murray's Lessee
and Crowell, had some structure. There the Court apparently limited the
doctrine to disputes between the government and private parties over the
performance of legislative or executive obligations."' Public rights cases
were thus distinguishable from suits at common law, which the Court in
Murray's Lessee said could not be withdrawn from article III courts' jurisdiction." 2 Atlas Roofing incorporated this public rights exception into
13
seventh amendment jurisprudence."
In the wake of Union Carbide and Schor, however, the definition of
public rights has devolved into near-tautology. Public rights, according
to the Court's current formulation, are matters that the executive and
legislative branches can conclusively determine.' ' But what can those
branches not conclusively determine? The line between public and private rights has blurred, at least where Congress has integrated the private
right at issue into a statutory scheme." 5 More importantly, the distinction first drawn in Murray's Lessee-between public rights and suits at
common law-is no longer determinative. Although the Schor opinion
108. Id. at 853-54; see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing Union Carbide's "pragmatic understanding" observation).
109. Id. at 853-57. Applying this analysis, the Court upheld the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims.
110. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
111. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
112. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
113. 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977) ("At least in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated...
the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and
initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible.").
114. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986).
115. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985); see also
supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text
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cited Murray's Lessee, the Court would guarantee only "searching" review under article III in cases "where private, common law rights are at
stake."116 Moreover, in performing this searching review, the Court
adopted a "de minimis" test, allowing minor intrusions into the private
17
rights jurisdiction of the federal courts.1
If the importance of the public rights doctrine has faded in article
III jurisprudence, the Supreme Court will likely give the doctrine even
less credence in the context of seventh amendment jury trial challenges.
Even as the public rights exception reached its zenith in Northern Pipeline, Justice White, five years after his seventh amendment opinion in
Atlas Roofing, indicated in dissent his belief that the public rights doctrine had already received its "death blow" in Crowell, which permitted a
factfinding role for agencies in matters that involve private rights. 1 8 After Union Carbide and the development of the Schor balancing test, the
public rights/private rights distinction no longer serves as a bright-line
test in any context. 119
The Court has long recognized the link between article III and the
seventh amendment, 120 and recent article III developments raise the
question whether the public rights doctrine survives at all as a constitutional theory in the seventh amendment context. The Court's reliance in
Atlas Roofing on cases primarily concerned with an article III objection
suggests a decline in the doctrine's importance.1 21 The doctrine's devaluation in the article III cases does not, however, compel the conclusion
that public rights theory has lost all of its force in seventh amendment
cases.

The article III cases that deemphasize public rights are distinguishable from the seventh amendment cases. According to Schor, article III
protects both institutional (separation of powers) concerns and individual
litigants' rights.' 22 In contrast, the purpose of the seventh amendment is
116. Schor, 478 U.S. at 854.
117. Id. at 856-57.
118. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 109-10 (1982)

(White, J., dissenting).
119. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 853; Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 585-86.
120. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
450-52 (1977) (discussing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land

& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856)). In Murray's Lessee, a seventh amendment
objection was raised but never discussed by the Court. The Crowell Court disposed of the seventh

amendment objection on the grounds that the case was within the admiralty jurisdiction. 285 U.S. at
45.
122. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
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solely the protection of individuals. 123 The Schor Court found that the
individual litigant had waived his right to an article III trial by demanding that the administrative tribunal decide his state-law claim.12 4 The
Court's public rights analysis, therefore, arguably reflects only article III
institutional concerns. 125 Notwithstanding its article III implications,
Schor need not signal the erosion of the public rights doctrine in the
seventh amendment context.

IV. THE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Assuming for the sake of discussion that the public rights doctrine
no longer restricts Congress's ability to delegate adjudicatory power to

administative agencies, no seventh amendment check on congressional
overreaching exists. Congress in fact continues to define new statutory
rights and to provide for agency adjudication of those rights, 126 and the
Court so far has deferred to Congress's delegations of adjudicatory

authority.
The current uncertainty about the seventh amendment limitations
on agency determinations may reflect the Court's view that Congress has
not yet breached those limitations. The Court has never held that an

administrative tribunal may adjudicate a purely private right without a
jury trial. 127 The Court, after all, declines to answer unnecessary constitutional questions. 28 Understanding the seventh amendment precedents
first requires an examination of the Court's rationale for deferring to
Congress.
The Court has cited several practical considerations supporting administrative adjudication; some of these factors explain the Court's defer123. See, e.g., Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (citizens' fundamental and
sacred right to jury trial is protected by seventh amendment); Wolfram, supra note 15, at 646 n.21
(seventh amendment is not rule of mere judicial administration, but of personal protection to
litigants).
124. Schor, 478 U.S. at 849.
125. This analysis, however, is hard to reconcile with the Court's discussion of private rights.
Id. at 853-54.
126. See Comment, The ConstitutionalRights to Trial by Jury and AdministrativeImposition of
Money Penalties, 1976 DUKE L.J. 723, 724 (Congress has granted an increasing number of agencies
statutory authority to issue monetary penalties, subject to only limited judicial review); see also S.
558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2256 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (amendments to Fair
Housing Act providing for new administrative enforcement mechanism).
127. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
457-58 (1977) (right to jury trials in "[w]holly private tort, contract, and property cases" has not
been destroyed by the Court's precedents).
128. See, eg., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Court will not anticipate questions of constitutional law and decide
them before properly presented).
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ence. First, the administrative bureaucracy is so pervasive that newly
created restrictions on Congress's authority could jeopardize the constitutionality of large segments of that bureaucracyl 29-a legitimate consideration when the Court considers the scope of constitutionally protected
130
individual rights.
The Court's deference to congressional decisions to withdraw the
determination of statutory rights from the judicial branch may also reflect institutional self-preservation. The courts have only a limited capacity to deal with the overwhelming number and technical complexity
of cases now adjudicated in agencies. 3 1 As Justice White stated in Atlas
Roofing: "Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke
the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation... 22132
He thus praised the "speedy and expert resolution[ ] of the issues" in
agency adjudication. 133
The Court's tendency to respect congressional determinations of the
appropriate adjudicatory forum also reflects a perception of the "functional limitations" of juries. Commentators have suggested, 34 and the
Court in Ross v. Bernard has apparently acknowledged,135 that the pre129. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113. As Justice White stated in dissent:
Unless we want to overrule a large number of our precedents upholding a variety of Art. I
courts-not to speak of those Art. I courts that go by the contemporary name of "adminstrative agencies"-this conclusion is inevitable. It is too late to go back that far; too late
to return to the simplicity of the principle pronounced in Art. III and defended so vigorously and persuasively by Hamilton in The Federalist....

Id.
130. Individual rights are not absolute. Fundamental rights such as privacy in childbearing may
be restricted by Congress if necessary to promote a "compelling" government interest. See, eg., P.
BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 673 (2d ed. 1983) (quoting Justice Brennan's opinion in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 686 (1977), concerning state regulation of contraception). Specific Bill of Rights guarantees may also be restricted. See, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728-29 (1978) (broadcaster's first amendment rights restricted). Unlike most other Bill of Rights guarantees, the seventh
amendment right to jury trial has not been held "fundamental," and thus is not applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92

(1876).
131. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (agency adjudications necessary to apply and
enforce regulations in the "thousands of cases involved"); Fallon, supra note 1, at 953 (outlining
several limiiiations on federal judiciary in a highly regulated modern society and noting that "[to
require initial judicial resolution of all disputes would place an overwhelming burden on courts and
litigants that our tradition sensibly has sought to avoid.").
132. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455.
133. Id. at 461.
134. See, e.g., Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 829-30 (1980); Comment, The Right to Trial by Jury: Old
English Law Supports a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 11 SEToN HALL L. REv.
31, 31-34 (1980).
135. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). Footnote l0 in Ross has engendered prolific commentary in
the law journals and in the lower courts. The Court in Ross indicated that the "practical abilities
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sumed "practical" shortcomings of lay juries may restrict the right to a
jury trial. This functionalist argument, however, has little historical support. 136 The Framers recognized that at least one function of the seventh
amendment was to protect individual litigants against corrupt judges;
now, however, a litigant may be entitled to a jury trial before a judge
insulated by article III's protections, but not before administrative adjudicators unprotected by article III.137 Moreover, the idea of rejecting a
constitutional guarantee as too burdensome is inconsistent with the
Framers' views, and the Court's modem Bill of Rights jurisprudence. 13 8

The functionalist argument, then, seems a weak rationale for deference to
Congress's forum choices.
Straightforward political considerations provide a stronger ration-

ale. Elected representatives are presumably sensitive to the value that the
general population places on the right to trial by jury. Thus, Congress is
unlikely to expand the administrative state to the point of effectively
eliminating that right in civil cases. 139 Viewed in this context, the
Court's failure to articulate a definitive seventh amendment limit may
create an uncertainty desirable to the most ardent proponents of the right
to a jury trial. Congress, fearing the wrath of both the public and the
and limitations of juries" was one factor that courts could consider in determining the nature of an
issue and the applicability of the seventh amendment. The Court has applied this functionalist approach only in the context of administrative adjudication, "with which the jury would be incompatible." Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450; see also Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 n.4 (1987)
(considering practical limitations of juries).
136. See Wolfram, supra note 15, at 742 n.304 (noting that at time of the seventh amendment,
Pennsylvania and Connecticut provided right to jury trial in virtually all civil cases, but that Alexander Hamilton opposed jury trials in equity courts "because it would necessitate the trial by jury of
'questions too complicated for a decision in that mode!" (quoting THE FEDERALIST No, 83, at 570
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961))).
137. See id. at 653; see also Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) ("Evidence suggests that various agencies
have used the possibility of removal as a tool for coercing decisions that are consistent with the
agency's wishes.").
138. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 648 n.33.
Different theories of constitutional interpretation have been identified and accepted as legitimate. Professor Fallon addresses the "commensurability problem" inherent when the different theories are applied in a specific constitutional context by proposing a "constructivist coherence theory."
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REv. 1189
(1987). Professor Fallon argues that the different interpretative theories are substantially interrelated and interdependent; the constitutional interpreter therefore can usually achieve a "constructivist coherence" that answers the constitutional question. Id at 1193. That different theories of
constitutional interpretation lead to the conclusion that the right to a jury trial cannot be eliminated
simply on "functionalist" grounds is consistent with Professor Fallon's model.
139. See Hart, The Powerof Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rav. 1362, 1365 (1953) ("Congress so far has never tried to destroy the
Constitution."). But cf Barrett, The ConstitutionalRight to Jury Trial. A HistoricalException for
Small Monetary Claims, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 148 (1987) (1794 Pennsylvania statute diminished
right to jury trial as it existed when state's constitution was adopted).
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courts, has a powerful incentive to act prudently when vesting agencies
with expansive authority. 140 Congress might even find it politically appealing to provide a right to a jury trial where none is constitutionally
141
required.
Political restrictions in fact sealed the fate of Senate bill 558, legislation that would have restricted the scope of the seventh amendment. The
bill would have amended the enforcement provisions of prior fair housing
legislation to allow a party charging discriminatory housing practices to
seek damages either before an administrative law judge (ALJ) or in federal court, with review in the circuit courts of appeals. 142 The consensus
of academic opinion voiced before the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary was that the Senate bill would be constitutional under the Supreme
Court's seventh amendment jurisprudence.143 Compromise legislation
eliminating mandatory administrative adjudication was proposed, however, and eventually passed after opponents objected to S. 558's encroachment on jury trial rights. 144 As the Court defines the ultimate
140. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87.
141. See 5 J. MOORE, supra note 18, 38.08[5.--4] ("There is nothing in the Seventh Amendment nor in Article III that precludes Congress from extending the right of jury trial to non-common law actions .... although as a general proposition it has not seen fit to do so.").
142. S. 558, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2259 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987).
143. The Subcommittee on the Constitution will issue no report concerning the constitutionality
of S, 558. Professors Thomas Rowe of Duke, Girardeau Spann of Georgetown, and Arthur Wolf of
Western New England College testified before the Subcommittee and concluded that the enforcement provisions of S. 558 did not violate the seventh amendment. Telephone interview with staff
members of Subcommittee on the Constitution (Sept. 13, 1988).
144. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 19, 1987, and hearings
were held by the Subcommittee on the Constitution. [1987-1988] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,008. On
June 23, 1987, the Subcommittee approved S. 558 by a four-to-one vote. 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 3227 (1987). The Supreme Court confirmation battles involving Judges Bork, Ginsburg and
Kennedy stalled action by the Senate Judiciary Committee for a considerable time. Id. A House
counterpart bill, H.R. 1158, was approved by the House Judiciary Committee on April 27, 1988, but
received strong Republican opposition because the bill proposed to allow an administative law judge
to levy fines against alleged housing discriminators without the benefit of a jury trial. See Fair
Housing BillApproved by House JudiciaryCommittee, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1159 (1988). The
House overwhelmingly passed H.R. 1158 on June 29, 1988. See PrognosisGood as HousingBill Goes
to Senate, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1838 (1988).
The Senate passed a compromise version of H.R. 1158, eliminating the mandatory administrative adjudication. See Backed by Reagan, Senate OKs Fair-HousingLaw, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 2203 (1988). Under the compromise bill, an alleged housing discriminator, notified by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development of an action pending against him, may choose between the administrative forum or federal court. Id. The amendment defused the President's seventh amendment objections to past versions of the bill. Id. The Senate version of H.R. 1158 was
sent to the House, which approved the compromise measure by voice vote on August 8, 1988.
[1987-1988] 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 34,101. President Reagan signed the compromise version of H.R.
1158, with its choice-of-forum provision, on September 13, 1988. See 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. - (Sept. 19, 1988). This note uses the original version of S. 558 to illustrate seventh amendment issues raised by congressional attempts to mandate administrative adjudication.
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scope of the seventh amendment, its deference to Congress surely reflects

an awareness of the dynamics of the democratic political model.
Deference to Congress, however, is not absolute and must yield
when the Court faces a clear constitutional command. 45 A primary objection to the Constitution concerned the Framers' failure to provide a

right to civil jury trial. 146 That objection echoed the colonists' outcry
when the jurisdiction of a nonjury forum-the vice-admiralty courtwas expanded under English rule. 147 As the Court recognized in Curtis
v. Loether, and now needs to reaffirm, practical policy considerations are
"insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh
48
Amendment."1
V.
A.

RETHINKING ATLAS ROOFING

Forum-DependentAnalysis.
Atlas Roofing illustrated the Supreme Court's reluctance to invali-

date, in the context of a seventh amendment attack, an administrative
scheme conferring broad enforcement powers. The Court reviewed the

Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, which allows the Occupational Health and Safety Administration to impose civil penalties on vio-

lators and collect those penalties in federal court.'4 9 The Court upheld
the Act against the seventh amendment challenge, but limited its holding
to cases involving public rights. Commentators initially criticized the
Court's use of the public rights doctrine as a deviation from the historical

test. 150 This criticism, as well as the Court's subsequent deemphasis of
the public rights doctrine in article III cases indicates the need to consider alternate justifications for the Atlas Roofing decision.

One plausible justification for the Atlas Roofing decision is that the
seventh amendment simply does not apply to administrative proceedings,
because they are technically not suits at common law.' 5 ' This forum145. See, eg., Northern Pipelin 458 U.S. at 73 (portion of Bankruptcy Act of 1978 threatened
"to supplant completely our system of adjudication in independent Art. III tribunals").
146. See Wolfram, supra note 15, at 657 (noting that entire discussion in Constitutional Convention on lack of a Bill of Rights was sparked by question on right to jury trial). Wolfram's article
documents the historical background of the seventh amendment.
147. See Note, supra note 52, at 1465 n.34 ("British use of vice-admiralty courts to deprive
colonists of their rights to jury trial was one of the most disliked aspects of English rule.").
148. 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974); see also Redish, supra note 24, at 521.
149. See, eg., Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 17, 84 Stat. 1590, 1606 (1970) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 666 (1982)).
150. See, eg., Kirst, supra note 63, at 1293-311 (arguing that there really is no public rights
exception).
151. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,48 (1937) ("The instant case is not
a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit.... It is a statutory proceeding."); F. JAMES &
G. HAzARn, supra note 53, § 8.11, at 450-51.
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dependent analysis does have historical support, as the Atlas Roofing
Court noted, 152 since the pre-1791 right to a jury trial turned on the forum in which a suit was tried-a law court or an equity court. 153 A pure
forum-dependent analysis, however, ignores the Court's consistent rulings that the jurisdiction of equity (and admiralty) is not unlimited, but is
confined by the seventh amendment. 154 Unless either the seventh amendment or article III limits Congress's ability to delegate adjudicatory authority to administrative agencies, the agencies' decisionmaking power
seems potentially limitless, confined only by Congress's sense of self-

restraint. 155
Pure forum-dependent analysis also runs counter to the Court's consistent interpretation of the seventh amendment. Since Parsons v. Bedford, the Court has maintained that the seventh amendment protects the
right to jury trial when legal rights are at issue. 15 6 The seventh amendment applies to common law suits involving legal rights-not to common

law courts.157
It has been argued that the Court could resolve the inconsistency
between its seventh amendment jurisprudence and the forum-dependent
doctrine by simply holding that statutory actions are not suits at common law.1 5 8 Such an argument suggests, however, that no right to jury
trial exists in statutory actions adjudicated before either a federal court
or an administrative agency-and the Court has clearly held that statutory actions can be suits at common law within the meaning of the seventh amendment.1 5 9 The argument that statutory actions are not suits at
Similar arguments arise in the bankruptcy context. Some authorities assert that no constitutional right to a jury trial exists in any bankruptcy matter because bankruptcy courts are traditionally considered courts of equity. See Gibson, supra note 112, at 1004 & nn.172-73. Professor

Gibson, however, argues that a legal claim is not "magically transformed" into an equitable one
merely because it is asserted in bankruptcy court. Id at 1018. Although bankruptcy adjudication is
distinguishable from agency adjudication, see id. at 1024-25, the abridgment of a constitutional right,
based on such a simple rationale, is inappropriate in both contexts.
152. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,458-61
(1977) (discussing precedent to support proposition that seventh amendment right to jury trial de-

pends on forum in which action is brought).
153. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
154. See 5 J. MOORE, supra note 18, 38.08[5.-4].
155. See, eg., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (using article III to strike down provision in Bankruptcy Act that shifted too
much adjudicatory authority from federal judiciary to article I courts).
156. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).

157. See Redish, supra note 24, at 519-20 (Justice Story's opinion in Parsonssuggests that right
to jury trial could extend to administrative proceedings).
158. See Note, supra note 52, at 1459-60.
159. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal
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common law also clashes with the historical test' 6° and, arguably, with
constitutional theories that consider changing social conditions in inter161
preting the Constitution.
Significantly, the Atlas Roofing Court relied on article III precedents
in establishing a seventh amendment public rights limitation on Congress's discretion to delegate adjudicatory authority. 162 Atlas Roofing
implies that the Court's article III analysis will adequately protect seventh amendment concerns. Given the close relationship between the seventh amendment and article 111,163 Schor's article III balancing test'6
may sufficiently protect the seventh amendment right to trial by jury. 165
B.

Atlas Roofing and Schor.

A hypothetical congressional enactment illustrates how the Schor
test might apply. Assume that Congress, acting under the commerce
clause, 166 decides to establish a national fare structure for all taxicabs
servicing airports. As the legislative history indicates, Congress has
found that fare disputes between drivers and passengers present a major
problem; it expects the filing of a large number of cases under the statute.
The federal statute regulates only fares; it does not regulate such things
as driver licensing requirements, scheduling, or taxi safety. The legislation provides that the Department of Transportation will adjudicate all
fare disputes before an ALJ in an "on-the-record" proceeding.1 67 Parties
may appeal decisions to the Secretary of Transportation and then to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or
the circuit in which their case arose. The Administrative Procedure Act
68
governs the scope of review in the courts of appeals.
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."); see supra
notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
160. Statutory actions could be adjudicated in common law courts. See, ag., Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 379 (1974) (during reign of Henry VI, jury trials were available in actions to
recover possession of property under forceable entry and detainer statute).
161. See Redish, supra note 24, at 487 ("Ever since Chief Justice Marshall admonished that it 'is
a constitution we are expounding," courts generally have been willing to read the broad language of

the Constitution to account for changing social conditions.") (footnote omitted).
162.
163.
164.
165.

See
See
See
Cf

supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
supra notes 24 and accompanying text.
supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 52, at 1473 n.81 ("[Ilf Article III does not require adjudication of the

action in an Article III tribunal, the action cannot be a 'suit at common law' for seventh amendment
purposes.").
166. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
167. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982) (on-the-record agency
adjudications).
168. See id. § 706. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, "the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law." The agency's findings in the hypothetical would be set aside if "un-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:539

The four-part Schor balancing test may allow administrative adjudication under the hypothetical statute. First, because judicial review is

available in the court of appeals, the statutory scheme arguably reserves
the essential attributes of judicial power to article III courts. 169 Second,
the ALJs have no ancillary jurisdiction and are vested with only the lim-

ited powers necessary for agency adjudication, not the broad powers of
article III judges. 170 Third, the Court has been consistently sympathetic

to Congress's attempts to provide efficient, expedient adjudication of a
large number of cases without burdening the federal courts. 17 1 Under
Schor's fourth factor, however, fare disputes between passengers and

drivers clearly involve private rights not closely integrated into a pervasive regulatory scheme.
The Schor balance suggests that the hypothetical statute would pass

article III constitutional muster as only a de minimis infringement of the
judiciary's constitutional role. 172 The Court has said that no single factor
is determinative, 173 and the Court has relegated the public rights doctrine
to the status of a "pragmatic understanding."' 1 74 More importantly, the
Court no longer recognizes the ultimate distinction between public rights

and "suits at common law." 175 Thus, the weight of the Schor factors,
pragmatic considerations, 176 and recent precedent support the conclusion
that the hypothetical statute does not violate article III.
If the Court were to face a congressional statute similar to this hyposupported by substantial evidence." Id. § 706(2)(E); see id. § 556 (section applies to § 554 "on the
record" proceedings).
169. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) (article III
courts review CFTC orders under "weight of the evidence" standard and legal rulings under de novo
standard); cf Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 573-74, 592 (1985) (limited
judicial review of arbitrator's decision by article III court).
170. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (bankruptcy judges had impermissibly broad jurisdiction and powers).
171. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (administrative adjudication relieves courts
of serious burden, preserves courts' authority to ensure proper application of law, and makes application of law in large number of cases possible); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) ("Congress is not required by the Seventh
Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented
from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in
the relevant field.").
172. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-52 ("the congressional scheme does not impermissibly intrude
on the province of the judiciary").
173. Id. at 851.
174. Id at 853 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985));
see supra notes 99, 107.08 and accompanying text.
175. Schor, 478 U.S. at 854; see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the practical considerations that favor judicial restraint in the face of
congressional action, see supra notes 126.41 and accompanying text.
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thetical one, the Court could hold that the statute satisfies article II1177
but violates the seventh amendment. When Congress creates a new statutory right, it has substantial discretion to prescribe the manner of the
right's adjudication, 178 but that discretion has a limit. 179 A workable
limit would be to invalidate statutes that create new causes of action in-

volving private parties and that authorize administrative determinations
of these private rights outside the scope of a comprehensive regulatory

scheme. If Congress has not created a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
then the Court should conclude that (1) the right involved is not a public
right and (2) the legal remedies are not "inadequate."
The several dimensions of the public rights concept are all consistent

with the conclusion that a right is not a "public right" unless it is created
as part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. A public right may imply
the vindication of a public interest.'i 0 By creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme, Congress implies that it has found a public benefit suffi-

cient to warrant substantial expenditures of resources, even if rights
under the scheme are enforced by private individuals. Private matters

may be imbued with the public interest when Congress recognizes an
emergency and responds by creating a regulatory scheme.' 8 ' Furthermore, Congress's efforts to ensure uniform public compliance with its
82
statutory goals are clearest when it enacts a broad regulatory scheme.
Finally, using substantial governmental involvement as the defining crite-

rion for the public rights concept is consistent with the Court's past ef83
forts to define, or to avoid defining, the concept.

177. Theoretically, S. 558 could also pass Schor's four-part article III test. For a discussion of
the test, see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
178. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 (1982) (plurality
opinion); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.6, at 500 (1985).
179. See, ag., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84; see also James, supra note 19, at 656.
180. See Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially QualifiedJuriesand Expert Nonjury Tribunals Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887, 966
(1981).
181. Cf Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154-55, 158 (1921) (statutory regulation of rental housing
in wake of World War I).
182. See Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 180, at 965 (lower court cases suggest that one of
principal purposes of action based on public right is to ensure uniform compliance with statutory
requirements).
183. See supra notes 68-70, 94-95 and accompanying text. The action that the Court will undertake is in many ways analogous to "state action" analysis under the fourteenth amendment. Many
of the constraints stated in the Constitution apply only to governments; the Court will scrutinize
actions that have both governmental and private elements in an effort to find state action. Public
rights analysis is not dissimilar, although a finding of a public right and a finding of state action have
opposite results: the seventh amendment right to jury trial does not apply in public rights cases, but
fourteenth amendment guarantees apply only where there is state action. The state action doctrine
is, if anything, more confused than the public rights doctrine. See generally Rowe, The Emerging
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By defining a seventh amendment limit based on -the finding of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Court can reconcile Atlas Roofing's forum-dependent doctrine with earlier seventh amendment caselaw
that emphasized the "inadequacy of legal remedies" as the basis for the
growth of equity, a nonjury forum. 1 4 The Atlas Roofing Court analogized Congress to the King's Chancellor, noting the power of each to
create new rights and remedies and provide for their adjudication in a
nonjury forum if the "remedies available in courts of law were inadequate."185 The Court must, however, require that Congress demonstrate
the inadequacy of the legal remedies and the necessity of adjudication in
an administrative forum. Congress makes this demonstration concretely
by enacting a broad regulatory scheme. If lines are to be drawn, the
Court should require a strong congressional showing before causing the
jury trial right to be forfeited.
A critical distinction, then, between the hypothetical taxicab statute
and statutes like S. 558186 is that the taxicab statute is not part of any
broad regulatory scheme. It simply involves congressional withdrawal of
a traditional common law cause of action from federal court jurisdiction.
One might argue that the seventh amendment is generally inapplicable to
administrative proceedings,' 87 or that remedies at law are "inadequate"
where Congress has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme because
of the large number of cases involved or their technical complexity.' 88
But the right in the taxicab statute is clearly private. The Court could
use the Tull two-step seventh amendment test to uphold the right to a
jury trial. 189 Under this test, the cause of action is analogous to a common law debt action, and the money damages at issue are a legal remedy.
Thus, under the seventh amendment, administrative adjudication under
the taxicab statute would fail.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The seventh amendment right to a jury trial is implicated every time
Congress creates a new statutory cause of action and delegates the responsibility for adjudication under the statute to an administrative
Threshold Approach to State Action Tying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69
GEo. L.J. 745 (1981),
184. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
185. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460

(1977); see Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 180, at 978.
186. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.

187. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
188. 3. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 178, § 11.6, at 500.
189. See Tull v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987); supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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agency. The Supreme Court, while stating that the seventh amendment
does not generally apply to administrative adjudications, has proceeded
to establish a seventh amendment limit on Congress's authority to delegate, based on Atlas Roofing's public rights doctrine. The public rights
doctrine has received more attention in article III cases, but even in that
closely related area of constitutional law, the doctrine is not well-defined.
It is thus unclear whether the Supreme Court will expand the doctrine in
future seventh amendment challenges, or whether the public rights doctrine will fall into disuse. The doctrine has the potential to serve as an
effective and workable limit on Congress's authority, though the Court
has never invalidated under the seventh amendment a congressional statute that delegates adjudicatory responsibility to federal agencies. The
Court, should refrain from excessive deference to Congress and should
protect the seventh amendment from continued erosion in our growing
administrative state. Without clear seventh amendment guidance, Congress will continue to create administrative agencies and delegate more
and more adjudicatory power to them, slowly eroding the constitutional
protections provided by the jury system.
Paul K. Sun Jr.

